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Abstract 
Transitive inference is claimed to be “deductive”. Yet every group/species ever reported 
apparently uses it. We asked 58 adults to solve 5-term transitive tasks, requiring neither training 
nor premise learning. A computer-based procedure ensured all premises were continually visible. 
response-accuracy and  RT (non-discriminative nRT) were measured as typically done. We also 
measured RT confined to correct responses (cRT). Overall, very few typical transitive phenomena 
emerged. The symbolic distance effect never extended to premise recall and was not at all evident 
for nRT; suggesting the use of non-deductive end-anchor strategies. For overall performance and 
particularly the critical B?D inference,  our findings indicate deductive transitive inference is far 
more intellectually challenging than previously thought. Contrasts of our present findings against 
previous findings, suggests at least two distinct transitive inference modes, with most research and 
most computational models to date targeting an associative mode rather than their desired 
deductive mode. This conclusion fits well with the growing number of theories embracing a “Dual 
Process” conception of reasoning. Finally, our differing findings for nRT versus cRT, suggests 
researchers should give closer consideration to matching the RT measure they use to the particular 
conception of transitive inference they pre-held. 
 
Key Words: Adult Reasoning, Dual Process Theory, Relational Reasoning, Symbolic Distance 
Effect, Transitive Inference. 
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Getting One Step Closer to Deduction: Introducing an Alternative Paradigm for Transitive 
Inference 
   When a reasoner coordinates two or more pieces of information to deduce a new conclusion, 
and those pieces of information overlap in a linear way, then s/he may have engaged in Transitive 
Inference (Goel, Makale & Grafman, 2004; Goodwin & Johnson-Laird, 2005; Martin & Alsop, 
2004). Consider the following example. During your lunch break yesterday, you might have gone 
out running with one friend (say Jane), and noted that you really struggled to keep up with her. 
We can term the above information a premise, where A and B are entities and there is some 
comparison made between them (i.e. premise A:B). Now, during today’s lunch break you ran the 
same route with Kerry, and noted she was really struggling to keep up with you (premise B:C). At 
the end of the day, Kerry tells you Jane has asked her to go running during tomorrow’s lunch 
break, asking you whether you think she will struggle or not (A?C). A transitive inference allows 
you to work out that, exceptional circumstances aside, Kerry will struggle running with Jane. The 
beauty is that you can infer such an outcome, without having already experienced it directly. 
Many argue that the capacity for transitive inference is logical (i.e., deductive), partly because the 
conclusion necessarily follows as long as the relation used is a linear comparative term (e.g., “runs 
faster than”), and partly because we can deduce the conclusion upon simply being told the two 
premises, rather than having to directly perceive and verify them as true for ourselves.  
   Transitive inference may lay at the heart of a plethora of cognitive and sub-cognitive 
competencies, from spatial navigation through to predicting where to find food; and from placing 
oneself within a social network through to scientific thinking (Allen, 2006; Archie et al., 2006; 
Bond, Kamil & Bolda, 2003; Hummel & Holyoak, 2001; Markovits & Dumas, 1999; Siemann & 
Delius, 1998; Wright, 1998a, 2001). Further, transitive tasks have been used as a tool in better 
understanding the similarities and differences between the mental processes of humans and non-
humans (Eichenbaum, 2001; Lazareva & Wasserman, 2006; Wu & Levy, 2001). It is for these 
                                                                                        Getting One Step Closer to Deduction 4
reasons among others, that some theorists argue that transitive inference potentially is an 
important window on cognition (Allen, 2006; Goel et al., 2004). 
  The above potential remains largely unfulfilled to date. This is because of a number of protracted 
and diversionary debates about who can solve transitive tasks, at what age, and by what means 
(Brainerd & Reyna, 1992; Bryant, 1998; Bryson & Leong, 2007; Holcomb, Stromer & Mackay, 
1997; Lazareva & Wasserman, 2006; Markovits & Dumas, 1992; McGonigle & Chalmers, 1992; 
Moses, Villate & Ryan, 2006; Russell, McCormack, Robinson & Lillis, 1996; Shafir, Waite & 
Smith, 2002; Siemann & Delius, 1996, 1998; Yamazaki, 2004). The debates flourish because of 
the pivotal role transitive inference was afforded in Piagetian theory and the resultant close 
scrutiny of both (Bouwmeester, Vermunt & Sijtsma, 2007; Breslow, 1981; Chapman, 1999; 
Piaget, 1970). The Piagetian classical 3-term task had loosely followed recommendations from 
cognitive theorists working in the area of reasoning or logic (Bara, Bucciarelli & Lombardo, 
2001; Demarais & Cohen, 1998; Goel et al., 2004; Goodwin & Johnson-Laird, 2005). Thus, the 
minimum two premise pairs were used (A:B and B:C), with the reasoner typically required to 
make the inference between items A and C (Hong & Chond, 2001; Sternberg, 1980; Wright & 
Dowker, 2002).  
   However, in a seminal paper, Bryant and Trabasso (1971) convincingly argued that the 
Piagetian 3-term task on the one hand could be passed without having to make an inference at all, 
but on the other hand may be failed because the premises may not be in memory at the time the 
inference is requested. These false-positive and false-negative arguments are extensively 
discussed elsewhere (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 1992; Wright, 2001). Here, it is sufficient to note 
that Bryant and Trabasso circumvented them by increasing the number of premises to four (A:B, 
B:C, C:D and D:E) and repeatedly training participants on these premises. The new task was 
called the IP-task which is short for the Information Processing task. It introduced to transitive 
research constructs like cues, memory encoding, symbolic mental representation, and response-
time (RT), which had recently been brought together as part of the generic information processing 
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approach to cognition (Trabasso, 1977). However, giving Bryant and Trabasso’s information 
processing transitive task the same label as an entire perspective used in psychology is potentially 
confusing. To avoid such confusion, we follow Russell et al.’s (1996) convention of referring to 
Bryant and Trabasso’s task as the B&T task.  
   The initial B&T finding was that transitive inferences are made by 4 years, which is around half 
the age estimate from the original Piagetian task (see also Holcomb et al., 1997). Then, since 
Bryant and Trabasso’s original demonstrations, over 90% of transitive studies have followed the 
B&T methodology of training participants on at least four premise pairs, for as long as it takes to 
reach near perfect performance (e.g., Acuna, Sanes & Donoghue, 2002; Holcomb et al., 1997; 
Lazareva & Wasserman, 2006; Martin & Alsop, 2004; Wright, 2006b). Of great significance, in 
addition to unexpectedly high performance in other human groups (Maydak, Stromer, Mackay & 
Stoddard, 1995; Stromer, Mackay, Cohen & Stoddard, 1993), almost any non-human group tested 
has passed the B&T task: From as large as the beluga whale or the elephant (Archie et al., 2006; 
Murayama & Tobayama, 1997) to as small as the jay or honey bee (Bond et al., 2003; Shafir et al., 
2002). 
   Despite highly contrasting findings between the B&T task and its 3-term predecessor (e.g., on 
age of reaching competence), many insist B&T tasks target precisely the same “logical” 
competence as the Piagetian task (Acuna et al., 2002; Bouwmeester et al., 2007; Bryant, 1998; 
Halford & Andrews, 2004; Yamazaki, 2004). Intriguingly, no theorist seems yet to have offered 
any rationale for exactly why the B&T task which requires 10 premises to be stored in memory, 
involves five interlinked items, and tests for no less than six inferences, should either be 
equivalent to or easier to solve than the 3-term task requiring only one inference to be made. 
Indeed, we may add Wright’s (2001) contention that the reasoner may consider some premises to 
be reversed in order and alternated in markedness (e.g., may perceive E<D instead of D>E). 
Additionally, as Goodwin and Johnson-Laird (2005) point out, the reasoner may interpret some 
premises as using negation of relations (e.g., E not as big as D, instead of E smaller than D). 
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Adding in these considerations ought to lead to the conclusion that the total number of 
combinations renders the B&T task extremely difficult compared to its 3-term counterpart, and 
perhaps particularly for children (Wright, 1998b, 2006a). In support of Wright’s postulate, 
Viskontas, Holyoak and Knowlton (2005) found that even when a 5-term task avoids having to 
memorise any information, such a task is very much more difficult than 3-term problems. 
   Over 3,000 research articles have now been devoted to transitive inference. The current state of 
the debate has led Bryant, arguably the most important contemporary figure in this area, to 
conclude that “The question of children's ability to make transitive inferences is one of the most 
vexed in the field of cognitive development.” (Bryant, 1998, pp.266). This view is echoed in some 
theoretical treatments of transitivity (e.g., Allen, 2006; Markovits & Dumas, 1992; Russell et al., 
1996). The overarching goal of the present paper was therefore to help reach an understanding of 
transitive inference that can integrate across perspectives. There were three more specific aims. 
The first was to determine whether removing the memory demands of a 5-term task would result 
in it becoming easier than its B&T task equivalent (e.g., Wright, 1998b, 2006a). The second aim 
was to determine whether response profiles almost invariably accepted in this area are as universal 
as most believe (Wright, 2006b). Today, most of the acclaimed B&T task profiles actually relate 
more to RT than to response-accuracy (e.g., Breslow, 1981; Holcomb et al., 1997; Hummel & 
Holyoak, 2001). The final aim was therefore to provide important data on the appropriateness of 
two different measures of RT. We expand on these aims below.  
1, Towards a Valid Normative Model of Transitive Inference  
   The first aim reduces to establishment of a limiting adult model – i.e., what level of competence 
is to be regarded as typical from early adulthood onwards? Such a model is essential if we are to 
understand transitive inference in children and non-humans. Breslow (1981) was among the first 
to address this question (see also, Goodwin & Johnson-Laird, 2005; Trabasso, 1977). However, 
all the data being modelled were tied to the B&T task. Markovits and Dumas (1992) and Russell 
et al. (1996) claimed that some B&T tasks (namely those developed for non-humans) 
                                                                                        Getting One Step Closer to Deduction 7
unintentionally assess a non-deductive transitive competence. Wright (2001) claims that this 
argument might also apply to different transitive tasks used with humans. In response, some 
theorists argue for the existence of two or more processes of transitive inference (Allen, 2006; 
Bryson & Leong, 2007; Goel et al., 2004; Lazareva & Wasserman, 2006; Markovits & Dumas, 
1999; Reyna, 2004; Schnall & Gattis, 1998; cf. Wright, 1998a). Such a postulate is directly in line 
with recent thinking about modes of reasoning more generally. Most notably, Evans (2003) 
discusses a Dual Process account of reasoning. This theory argues for the existence of an 
evolutionary-older network of brain structures for “associative” reasoning, plus a more specialist 
newer network for “deductive” reasoning (see also De Neys & Glumicic, in press; Ferreira, 
Garcia-Marques, Sherman & Sherman, 2006; Kokis et al., 2002; Reyna, 2004). 
   In contrast to dual process accounts of reasoning and of transitive inference in particular, some 
researchers continue to hold that transitive tasks may differ but transitive inference is one and 
only one cognitive ability (Bryant, 1998; Halford & Andrews, 2004; Wynne, 1998). Regardless of 
which conclusion one currently prefers, it remains the case that limiting research largely to the 
B&T task might restrict or even cause the types of theory that might be developed about other 
aspects of transitive inference (Wright, 1998a). For example, Brainerd and colleagues have 
conducted considerable research into the question of whether inferential responses derive from 
“gist” or from the premise information stored verbatim in memory (Brainerd & Kingma, 1984; 
Brainerd & Reyna, 1992). However, it may be that during day-to-day deductive transitive 
inference, reasoning about more than three-relations plus having to memorise all the premise 
information might be more of an exception rather than the rule (Allen, 2006; Goodwin & 
Johnson-Laird, 2005). Indeed, this may partly underlie the recent revision of gist theory, which 
was originally applied to transitive inference (Brainerd & Kingma, 1984), into what is now a very 
well specified dual process theory of both reasoning and memory (e.g., Reyna, 2004). 
   Finally here, some theorists (e.g., Bouwmeester et al., 2007; Dayton, 1998; Schnall & Gattis, 
1998; Wright, 2006a) provide evidence that the relational aspects of transitive reasoning are quite 
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well developed from 5 years, but not fully developed until well beyond childhood. Some also 
report data on age of peak transitive performance. For example, there seems to be a peak at 
roughly 18 years and a decline from middle age onwards (Hong & Chond, 2001; Viskontas et al., 
2005). As with the dual process accounts outlined above, this finding for transitive inference is 
directly mirrored by recent conclusions from reasoning tasks more generally (Evans, 2003; Kokis 
et al., 2002). Responding to the above issues, one aim of the present paper was to provide research 
findings that bridge the gap between children and adults, by working with participants who could 
be considered just too old to be typical of children and just too young to be typical of adults. 
According to all relevant theories, such a participant group would exhibit transitive performance 
at near ceiling (Acuna et al., 2002; Demarais & Cohen, 1998; Wright, 2006b).  
2, Established Transitive Phenomena and the B&T Task 
   One can ask whether typical phenomena found using variants on the B&T task are fully 
representative of active processes of transitive inference, or simply more general and low level 
phenomena tied only to the B&T task. For a 5-term series, the principal phenomenon should 
always have been the B?D inference (Holcomb et al., 1997; Titone et al., 2004). After all, it was 
to prevent “non-logical solution strategies” about this particular comparison-pair that Bryant and 
Trabasso brought together procedures from many previous studies into a single task/paradigm 
(Bryant & Trabasso, 1971; Trabasso, 1977). However, although initially the B?D inference may 
have been the main phenomenon of interest, other interesting effects were soon noted (for reviews 
see Allen, 2006; Hummel & Holyoak, 2001). For example, since the year 2000 alone, over 100 
research papers have used the finding of a symbolic distance effect as evidence of deductive 
transitive inference (Bond et al., 2003; Breslow, 1981; Siemann & Delius, 1996; Titone et al., 
2004; Trabasso, 1977). This effect can be explained using the convention of 3-step comparison for 
the A?E case, because in the implied series, there are three items B, C and D between the items 
being inferentially compared. Likewise, the A?D inference would be a 2-step comparison, the 
B?D inference a 1-step comparison, and the B:C premise would be a 0-step comparison. The 
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symbolic distance effect is then defined as the robust tendency for items having greater inferential 
step to be easier to solve than those with fewer inferential steps (Acuna et al., 2002; Favrel & 
Barrouillet, 2000; Moses et al., 2006; Wu & Levy, 2001).  
   The original interest in the symbolic distance effect stemmed from it readily separating an 
information processing approach to transitive inference from the Piagetian approach. Specifically, 
Trabasso argued that a Piagetian account of how the premises are coordinated in reaching an 
inference, predicts a reversed symbolic distance effect, with comparisons of greater inferential 
step being harder and slower to solve. Because the empirical evidence did not support a reversed 
symbolic distance effect, B&T advocates concluded that the Piagetian account of transitive 
inference must be incorrect (but see Breslow, 1981 for a neo-Piagetian account accommodating 
the standard symbolic distance effect, and Wright, 2006b and Favrel & Barrouillet, 2000 for 
reversed symbolic distance effects within B&T task variants). Today, the symbolic distance effect 
is held in such regard that many theorists take it as a stronger indicator of deduction than the B?D 
inference itself (Acuna et al., 2002; McGonigle & Chalmers, 1992; Wynne, 1998). 
   The symbolic distance effect is explained in terms of the reasoner representing the entire series 
in memory and using a mental search strategy in order to respond to pair-wise comparisons. Items 
further apart are towards the start of an ends-inward search strategy (Breslow, 1981), less 
confusable (Hummel & Holyoak, 2001), or associated with greater differentials in reinforcement 
value (Wynne, 1998). Any of these explanations would account for the profile of 3-step 
comparisons being easiest... 0-step comparisons being hardest. But it is curious that every article 
finding the symbolic distance effect also seems to have relied on a variant of the B&T task. This 
raises the possibility that the symbolic distance effect is an artefact of B&T-specific procedures 
such as the way the training regime forces the reasoner to hold the premise information in 
memory rather than a natural corollary of transitive inference (Allen, 2006). 
   A similar argument may be made for other key phenomena. Wynne (1998) argued for the 
existence of a lexical marking effect. Here, the most valued label is said to be unmarked, because 
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it is the default adjective for the relational comparative dimension. For example, if the dimension 
were bigger v smaller then any comparison-pair associated with an item given the unmarked label 
big more often during training would tend to be resolved more easily than one associated with the 
marked label small during training (Goodwin & Johnson-Laird, 2005; Hummel & Holyoak, 
2001). Thus, A:B and B:C should be easier than C:D and D:E, a finding both predicted from a 
statistical model and actually found for 5 to 13 year-olds (Bouwmeester et al., 2007). In a similar 
way, Breslow (1981) argued that the implied series is internalised from both ends towards the 
centre. Thus, the end two premises are acquired before the middle two premises. However, Wright 
(1998b) cast some doubt on this assertion as an explanation of how transitive inferences are made, 
both with child and adult participants. Indeed, in a robust replication with adults, although the 
expected profile was seen after extensive training, it was actually the inner premises that were 
learned first (Perner & Aebi, 1983; Wright, 2006b). 
   A further transitive phenomenon is the serial position effect. This refers to the finding that 
average performance involving a particular item improves the closer that item is to either end of 
the series (Bryson & Leong, 2007; Holcomb et al., 1997; Wynne, 1998). In the limit, comparisons 
involving item-C are generally the hardest, with a U-shaped curve seen for response-accuracy and 
an inverted-U for RT. This phenomenon may be considered a generalised instance of another 
effect called the end-anchor effect. The end-anchor effect refers to the common finding that 
comparisons involving one or both end-items are easier to resolve than those involving neither 
end-item. Various predictions follow. First, the A?E comparison is easiest to resolve of all 
(Maydak et al., 1995; Martin & Alsop, 2004; Wu & Levy, 2001). Next, a response to the A:B 
premise should be easier than to the D:E premise; a response to the A?C inference easier than the 
C?E inference; and a response to the A?D comparison easier than the B?E comparison (De Lillo, 
Floreano & Antinucci, 2001; Maydak et al., 1995). Overall, average performance for comparisons 
involving item-A should be superior to those involving item-E. On this issue, Wright (2006b) 
used a B&T variant which avoided all short-cut cues and kept training to a level that produced 
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around 90% overall performance. Wright found that there was no response-accuracy advantage to 
the A item, even at the end of training. In fact, it appeared that if anything, it is comparisons 
regarding the E item that lead to more accurate performance. This was interpreted as support for 
the thesis that the training regime, rather than the fact that transitive inferences were being made, 
lays behind the end-item effect. Thus, a study not relying on training is crucial to understanding 
this and the other effects. 
3, Response-Times for All Responses v Response-Times for Only Correct Responses 
   Transitive research uses response-accuracy as an index of performance. Many recent tasks also 
use RT instead of or additional to response-accuracy (e.g., De Lillo et al., 2001; Goel et al., 2004; 
Holcomb et al., 1997; Hummel & Holyoak, 2001; cf. Trabasso, 1977; Viskontas et al., 2005). 
However, just as with claims about who possesses a transitive inference competence and which 
phenomena demonstrate transitive reasoning, it would appear that all the reported profiles for RT 
have been found in variants of the B&T task. There is thus a real danger that the B&T task has 
become synonymous with the phenomenon of “transitive inference” itself. 
   Most transitive experiments using response-times, take RT to be the times across all responses 
for a given comparison-pair (Acuna et al., 2002; McGonigle & Chalmers, 1992). Because this use 
of RT is non-discriminative, we refer to it here as nRT and distinguish it from RT for correct 
responses only (cRT). However, if we are especially interested in cognitive mechanisms 
underlying correct transitive inference, then we should focus on cRT rather than nRT (Holcomb et 
al., 1997). This is because only correct responses tell us about the relative speeds of processes that 
generate veridical transitive inferences. Indeed, in other cognitive domains we routinely focus 
only on RTs for correct responses, or circumvent the whole issue by ensuring that incorrect 
responses are so few that the two alternative strategies essentially become the same (e.g., in the 
Stroop task –Wright & Wanley, 2003). The problem here is that transitive responses can be both 
near ceiling and near random chance for different comparisons within the same experiment. For 
this reason we decided to employ both nRT and cRT analyses. This also allowed us to compare 
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them to determine whether restricting analyses to cRT only, results in the same profiles across the 
transitive phenomena as found when nRT is used. 
   To address all the above issues, we followed suggestions from Wright (2001) and De Lillo et al. 
(2001) and devised a task based around a 5-term transitive series but that did not necessitate any 
training to remember premises (Markovits, Dumas & Malfait, 1995). The task used the relational 
comparison of size (e.g., “bigger than”). Following criteria recently set out by Wright (1998b), all 
the premise pairs were simultaneously visible on a computer screen, but the various premises 
were separated spatially. However, in line with some recent tasks using 3-term designs (e.g., 
Wright, 2006a; Wright & Dowker, 2002), participants only answered one question on any given 
transitive series, and then the premises were removed and replaced with new premises implying a 
different series.  
Method 
Participants 
   Participants were 58 young adults (36 female) from a college of further education in the West 
Midlands region of the UK. Their mean age was 17.89 years old. Three participants’ data were 
excluded from analyses presented later. Two did not follow the task instructions and one gave 
RTs more than 4 standard deviations above the mean for the whole sample. 
Materials 
   The main materials were a program to present premise pairs and collect responses. This was run 
on a PC compatible portable computer with a 2.4GHz PentiumM processor and a 50cm high-
resolution colour display. An external keypad device was used to collect responses. A paper 
version of the task was also used. Subject to each participant’s consent, the procedure was 
recorded using a tape recorder and microphone. This provided a means of noting any issues raised 
by the participant or notes made by the experimenter. 
Design 
   The experiment concerned the transitive relation of size, with all questions given in terms of the 
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unmarked label “bigger than” only. Each item in the transitive series was indexed by colour, as 
done in most transitive experiments with humans. The experiment itself was based on a repeated 
measures factorial design, and took response-accuracy, nRT and cRT as the main dependent 
variables of interest. Stimuli implying a 5-term transitive series were presented via four linearly 
interlinked premise pairs. This permitted each of the effects to be analysed via combinations of 
the 10 resultant pair-wise comparisons. For example, the symbolic distance effect could be 
analysed by grouping the four premises and six inferential comparisons according to inferential 
step. 
   The criteria outlined below were each randomised within limits. Each premise pair comprised 
two identical shapes side by side, differing in size and uniquely indexed by colour. The sizes and 
size-differentials were determined by earlier piloting, and were those which adult participants 
were shown to differentiate at between 98% and 100% within 2 seconds of presentation (Acuna et 
al., 2002). One premise was shown in each quadrant of the screen, with the real distance between 
the closest part of any two premises not less than 50mm and not more than 110mm in any 
direction. The distance between the closest part of the items comprising any given premise was 
between 5mm and 10mm. The height difference between the larger and smaller item of a pair was 
always 2mm, with their respective heights within a given pair being 31mm and 29mm. 
Additionally, the largest item in the series had a fixed width of 30mm, with the difference in 
width for items in a pair a constant 1mm, leading to an absolute and linear gradation of width for 
the series and a difference in width of 5mm between largest and smallest items in the series. With 
a minimum viewing distance of 500mm, the result was that the average premise subtended a 
vertical visual angle of 3.4 degrees and a horizontal of 7.1 degrees. Although the height variable 
represented categorical relationships, the width variable captured a linear gradation from the A 
item to the E item. Thus, in response to concerns raised about relative differences versus absolute 
overall differences (Markovits & Dumas, 1999; Wright & Dowker, 2002), we achieved 
presentation of stimuli that did in fact reflect a gradation but which participants would likely 
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interpret as categorical; leading to solution strategies more likely to be deductive.  
Procedure 
   If signed consent was given, the participant was introduced to the testing environment. The 
experiment was conducted in a quiet room within the college. The computer was set up with a 
separate keyboard so that the required viewing distance could be achieved. The purposes of the 
recording equipment was explained to the participant and then turned on only if additional consent 
was given for this. Every participant gave this consent. Before beginning the task proper, the 
participant was given a representation of the task on paper. Examples of the screen layout and 
stimuli were presented in colour, to familiarise each participant with the procedure ahead of the 
computerised task. The participant was asked at least one question regarding items relevant to the 
possible 0- to 3-step inferences. A new configuration was then presented with only one question 
asked, to familiarise the participant with the procedure to follow. The participant was given 
feedback on his/her answers and any questions or issues raised were discussed. It was also 
stressed that in the computer task, the participant should try to get each answer correct but also try 
to respond as quickly as s/he felt appropriate. The latter stage was repeated for four separate paper 
configurations. Each configuration used here concerned a different shape – rectangles, circles, 
sticks and triangles. Their purpose is explained below. 
   On-screen instructions explained the task and the requirements. The experiment was divided 
into three blocks, with a break between each. Lengths of breaks were determined by the 
participant, who pressed a key when ready to continue. The composition of the blocks was 
similar, with each having 40 pairs of displays and asking one question per display-pair. For each 
display-pair, a screen was first shown, having a question at a designated location at the bottom 
(following Wright, 1998b, 2006b). The question was of the form “Would A be bigger than B?”. 
This remained on screen until the participant was ready for the actual stimuli. When the 
participant pressed a designated key on a separate keypad to signal readiness, the question 
remained whilst the main part of the screen now introduced the premise information (the 
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configuration). Here, four item pairs were shown simultaneously on screen. The participant might 
choose whether to remember the question whilst viewing the premises, or check the bottom of the 
screen as and when s/he felt necessary. The participant pressed one key to signal “yes” and 
another for “no”. The computer recorded accuracy and RT for the first key-press and then waited 
for the participant to press the designated key to move on to the next question/configuration. 
   In order to minimise priming or proactive inhibition/interference effects from one configuration 
(i.e., one implied series) to another, each block comprised 10 presentations using a given shape, 
then 10 with an alternative shape and so on for the four shapes. For any given shape, the 10 
presentations together assessed performance on each of the four premises and six inferences, 
doing so once each. Neither the same series nor the same item/colours were used twice in 
consecutive display-pairs. For 50% of questions about two particular items of a premise/inference, 
the order of the item referents in the question was reversed (“A>B” v “B>A”). These were 
distributed across blocks and also distributed across shapes as evenly as possible. This meant that 
altogether there were 12 questions for each comparison-pair, half of which used each question 
referent order. The resultant presentations and question referents were randomised ahead of 
testing, with two such complete randomised orders of the 120 stimuli used to give two different 
versions of the task. Each participant sat only one of the two versions, determined by chance.  
   The above design and procedure resulted in a task that used immediate presentation, did not 
require memorising of premises and asked only one question per series. It could therefore be 
described as a “non-training single-response task”. Altogether the task took between 20 and 30 
minutes to complete, including briefing and debriefing. 
Results and Discussion 
   For response-accuracy data, correct responses for each comparison-pair in turn was summed 
across blocks, question-directions, series and shapes (max = 12). The resultant data are presented 
as percentages to aid more ready comparison against previous studies. Concerning response-
times, the median nRT for each comparison-pair was calculated in a similar way to response-
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accuracy. Relying on the median instead of the mean minimised outlier effects on a participant by 
participant basis. As well as improving homogeneity, this also meant that we did not have to apply 
any clean-up strategies to our data (contrast McGonigle & Chalmers, 1992). Next, we obtained 
the cRT dataset by repeating our procedure for only those individual responses that had been 
correct. A series of Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) were used to assess the 
statistical significance of the relevant trends shown in the response-accuracy, nRT and cRT data. 
Planned contrasts were conducted as appropriate. All tests were two-tailed with an alpha level of 
0.05. In the following sections, we present and briefly discuss response-accuracy and RT findings 
for (a) overall solution of the implied-series; (b) the symbolic distance effect; (c) the lexical 
marking effect; (d) the inward-acquisition effect; (e) end-anchor effects, (f) the serial position 
effect; and (g) the critical B?D inference and other 1-step inferences. 
(a) Overall Solution of the Implied-Series  
   Percentages of correct solutions to each of the 10 possible pair-wise comparisons are given in 
Table 1, with the corresponding cRTs and nRTs given in Table 2. Many theorists (e.g., 
Bouwmeester, 2007; Bryant, 1998; Halford & Andrews, 2004) intimate that, for humans, if one 
can solve one B&T task variant one can also solve another to the same extent. Indeed, without 
subscribing to this view, one cannot maintain the B&T task ever did target the same transitive 
competence as the classical 3-term task it dominates (Wright, 1998a). But from Table 1 we see 
that, across all 10 comparison-pairs, the overall response-accuracy was 63.8%. Also, response-
accuracy differed from one pair to the next. This was confirmed as statistically significant with a 
one-way repeated measures ANOVA (F (9, 486) = 57.075, p < 0.005, Obs.Power = 1.000).  
   Thus, performance here was more challenging than for any prominent study using the B&T 
task; including arguably the most demanding B&T variant to date (Wright, 2006b). This might be 
surprising, given that B&T variants require memorisation of premises, whereas here all premises 
were continually available for inspection. It adds support to Wright’s (1998a, 2001) contention 
that, in the generic B&T task, the method of committing the premise information to memory, such 
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as by over-training participants and using interlinked ascending/descending premise training, 
might “induce” rather than simply “allow” transitive solutions (Martin & Alsop, 2004; Russell et 
al., 1996; Stromer et al., 1993). Of course, the lower overall performance reported here might 
simply be a cohort effect. However, against this argument, we note that all our participants were 
in advanced level education (A’ Levels) and other researchers have found that participants at this 
age are approaching their peak for transitive reasoning (Demarais & Cohen, 1998; Hong & 
Chond, 2001; Viskontas et al., 2005).  
Insert Table 1 about here. 
   Turning to RT, neither the B&T task nor Wright’s variant on the classical task make explicit 
claims about nRT versus cRT. However, a generic cognitive view would hold that some correct 
answers are due to the participant considering the information just a little more carefully, or due to 
processing times for mentally sifting and selecting the logically-necessary information, hence 
taking longer. Conversely, some wrong answers would stem from a loss of concentration, 
premature responding or timeout; hence faster responses. Although neither set of strategies would 
be the sole basis of either correct or wrong responses, any tendency towards these respective 
strategies would lead to nRT being slightly speeded relative to cRT. Data for nRT are summarised 
in Table 2 (Top) with cRT summarised in Table 2 (Bottom). We first note that nRT was an 
average of 299ms faster than cRT. A two-way ANOVA was conducted, with factors of RT-Type 
and Comparison-pair. This showed a statistically significant difference between the two RT 
measures (F (1, 54) = 19.247, p < 0.005, Obs.Power = 0.991). As with response-accuracy earlier, 
the RT for the 10 pair-wise comparisons differed from one another; with the difference 
statistically significant both for nRT and cRT (F (9, 486) = 11.701, p < 0.005, Obs.Power = 
1.000). Table 2 suggests a rather complex interaction effect, with middle premise pairs and the 1-
step inferential pairs showing bigger differences between nRT and cRT. This interaction was 
statistically confirmed (F (9, 486) = 4.559, p < 0.005, Obs.Power = 0.999). 
   Perhaps with the exception of Holcomb et al. (1997), transitive inference researchers tend to 
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intimate that it is sufficient to use nRT as the index of speed of responding. However, our findings 
here show that, not only does nRT lead to over-favourable estimates of speed of decisions during 
transitive reasoning, but the amount of speed inflation depends on which particular comparison-
pairs are involved. This conclusion is borne in mind for the various transitive phenomena in the 
following sub-sections. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
(b) The Symbolic Distance Effect 
   The original B&T claim (Trabasso, 1977) was that retrieval from the kind of mental array set up 
by participants faced with the B&T task, should result in worst performance for those items most 
close together in the mental representation of the implied series, because their closeness makes 
them most difficult to discriminate between. Accuracy then improves the further away the items 
to be inferentially compared (see also Wynne, 1998; Wu and Levy, 2001). Because this profile is 
almost invariably accepted both in human and comparative research, we refer to it as the 
“Standard Symbolic Distance Effect”. The last column of Table 1 summarised our response-
accuracy data by inferential step. The general trend seems in line with Trabasso’s (1977) original 
assertion. A one-way ANOVA statistically confirmed the overall tendency towards a symbolic 
distance effect (F (3, 162) = 49.026, p < 0.005, Obs.Power = 1.000). But crucially, Table 1 shows 
that the 0-step pairs were not in line with this overall effect. Additional analyses by way of 
difference-contrast showed that 3-step inferences were superior to all the other inferential steps 
combined (p < 0.005). The 2-step inferences were then superior to 1-step inferences. But the 
tendency for 0-step inferences actually to be superior to 1-step and 2-step inferences combined 
was statistically significant (each p < 0.005).  
   For RT, the B&T view again holds that we should find a standard symbolic distance effect, with 
outermost pairs attracting the fastest times (Acuna et al., 2002). The last column of Table 2 
summarised for the symbolic distance effect. We first note the similar difference for nRT versus 
cRT to the difference between them that we noted for all 10 pairs (309ms). Of importance here, 
                                                                                        Getting One Step Closer to Deduction 19
the pattern of RTs did seem to reflect some variations with inferential-step, but these appeared 
stronger for cRT than for nRT. We assessed these trends using a two-way ANOVA, with factors 
of RT-Type and symbolic-distance. The main effect of RT-Type was statistically significant (F (1, 
54) = 16.114, p < 0.005, Obs.Power = 0.976). Symbolic-distance was also statistically significant 
(F (3, 162) = 11.710, p < 0.005, Obs.Power = 1.000).  
   To assess the symbolic distance effect in more detail, difference-contrasts were computed 
separately for nRT and cRT. For nRT the contrast between 0-step pairs and 3-step pairs did not 
approach statistical significance and nor did the difference between 2-step and the previous steps 
combined (each p > 0.100). However, the difference between 1-step and the three other 
inferential-step categories was statistically significant, both taken individually and combined 
(each p < 0.005). Thus, any contribution of nRT to the significant overall main effect of symbolic 
distance in the two-way ANOVA was driven mainly by the much longer nRT for the 1-step 
inferences, with no systematic symbolic distance effect from other inferential steps.  
   It is tempting to conclude the symbolic distance effect is abolished altogether by avoiding the 
B&T task. However, before reaching this conclusion, we need to determine whether its absence 
for nRT is mirrored by cRT. Table 2 and difference-contrasts analogous to those for nRT, together 
confirm that for cRT, 3-step inferences were significantly faster than 2-step inferences, and 2-step 
inferences faster than 1-step inferences (each p < 0.010). As found regarding response-accuracy, 
the 0-step responses were significantly faster than the other inferences on an individual basis 
(each p < 0.010). There was only one exception to this pattern, which was the contrast between 
the 0-step and 3-step responses (p > 0.100). Thus, unlike nRT, cRT shows a symbolic distance 
effect, although not the standard effect usually claimed from B&T tasks. 
   Comparing the top portion against the bottom portion of Table 2, shows a tendency for the 
difference between the two RT-Types to increase when two or more premises must be coordinated 
in order to deduce the response (i.e., 1-step and 2-step inferences), and to decrease greatly when 
no inference was logically required (i.e., for 0-step and 3-step responses). The suggested 
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interaction was confirmed in our above two-way ANOVA analysis by a significant interaction 
effect between RT-Type and symbolic-distance (F (3, 162) = 3.552, p < 0.050, Obs.Power = 
0.779). 
   So, whilst there is a symbolic distance effect for response-accuracy, it is not the standard 
symbolic distance effect the B&T task predicts. Rather, the effect holds only for inferential 
comparisons, with the 0-step taught pairs responded to more accurately than any other pairs apart 
from the 3-step end-pairs. Then for RT, when we use the index of nRT used in most transitive 
research but within a task that rules out passive seriative generalisation, the symbolic distance 
effect is abolished, with only the 1-step inferences (i.e., those most likely to require deduction 
here) showing longer nRT. But if we focus only on correctly given responses, then our cRT index 
now mirrors the non-standard symbolic distance effect we found for response-accuracy (i.e., it 
excludes the taught pairs). In line with our present findings, Wright (2006b) confirmed an overall 
symbolic distance effect for accuracy and nRT, on a B&T task variant; but noted that the 0-step 
versus 1-step comparisons did not fit the standard symbolic distance effect (accuracy - 88.5% v 
88.3%; nRT - 879ms v 921ms). An actual 0-step superiority was reported for children both on 3-
term and 5-term transitive tasks (Wright, 1998b, 2006a; Wright & Dowker, 2002). This profile 
can even be seen within Bryant and Trabasso’s (1971) seminal paper and in Wu and Levy’s 
(2001) computational data. 
(c) The Lexical Marking Effect 
   The lexical marking effect was assessed as the difference between the two premises at the large 
(unmarked) end of the implied series versus those at the small (marked) end. These were A:B and 
B:C versus C:D and D:E respectively. Table 3 summarises this effect along with other effects and 
evaluation of whether each effect fits with the B&T task. For lexical marking, Table 3 suggests 
that for response-accuracy the effect was actually in the reverse direction to predictions from the 
B&T task (Wynne, 1998). A one-way ANOVA statistically confirmed this tendency (F (1, 54) = 
28.750, p < 0.005, Obs.Power = 1.000). 
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   For RT, Table 3 shows that nRT was some 162ms faster than cRT overall. Roughly the same 
difference occurred both at the unmarked end and the marked end of the series. Table 3 also 
suggests a slight tendency towards a lexical marking effect for nRT and cRT (85ms and 75ms, 
respectively). We analysed the statistical significance of these data in the same way as for 
response-accuracy earlier, apart from adding a second factor in the ANOVA with two levels 
corresponding to RT and cRT. In the resultant two-way ANOVA, the main effect of RT-Type was 
statistically significant (F (1, 54) = 9.164, p < 0.005, Obs.Power = 0.844). However, the main 
effect of lexical category failed to reach statistical significance (F (1, 54) = 2.142, p > 0.100, 
Obs.Power = 0.301). Any two-way interaction also failed to reach statistical significance (F (1, 
54) < 1.000 N.S.). 
   So, we did find a lexical marking effect for response-accuracy but this was in the reverse 
direction to expectations from recent theorising, the B&T task and at least one recent experiment 
(see respectively, Bouwmeester et al., 2007; Goodwin & Johnson-Laird, 2005; Hummel & 
Holyoak, 2001). Also, regarding RT, there was no reliable lexical marking effect for either nRT or 
cRT.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
(d) The Inward-Acquisition Effect 
   Wynne (1998) presented alternative mathematical models consistent with the B&T assertion 
that the implied-series is built up from the ends-inwards. Using a variant of the B&T task with 
adults, Wright (2006b) replicated the finding that outer premises are responded to more accurately 
and faster than inner premises by completion of training. However, in the same experiment, it was 
also found that, early in training, inner premises are actually acquired better than the two outer 
premises (see also Perner & Mansbridge, 1983). We therefore sought to clarify using a task that 
encourages deductive solutions without inadvertently inducing seriative generalisation. The 
summary in Table 3 suggests better performance for the outer pairs compared to inner pairs. A 
one-way ANOVA showed this tendency to be statistically significant (F (1, 54) = 14.956, p < 
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0.005, Obs.Power = 0.967). The finding that inner premises have lower response-accuracy is in 
agreement with Acuna et al. (2002) and Breslow (1981). It implies the initial profile in Wright 
(2006b) stemmed from the influence of a different mode of reasoning to the final profile in that 
experiment; which Wright argued were associative and deductive, respectively.  
   For RT, Table 3 shows outer premises were responded to around 269ms faster than inner 
premises overall. Also, precisely the same difference in inward-acquisition was evident for nRT 
compared to cRT; although as usual, nRT tended to be the faster index. These trends were 
assessed using a two-way ANOVA analogous to that for lexical marking. The difference between 
nRT and cRT was statistically significant (F (1, 54) = 9.164, p < 0.005, Obs.Power = 0.844). The 
main effect of inward-acquisition was also statistically significant (F (1, 54) = 32.468, p < 0.005, 
Obs.Power = 1.000). There was no statistically significant two-way interaction (F (1, 54) < 1.000 
N.S.), showing that the contrast between inner and outer premises was identical for nRT and cRT. 
   Both the response-accuracy and RT profile for inward versus outward premise superiority are in 
line with assertions from the B&T task (Breslow, 1981). Note, the main difference between inner 
and outer premises is that outer premises involve one of the end-items. It therefore seems that the 
inward-acquisition effect may be in line with B&T task predictions and yet still be an artefact of 
the B&T task. For example, the reasoner may simply tend to check whether one of the items is in 
an end premise, and if not, then proceed to consider one of the inner premises instead. Indeed, this 
explanation can also account for the non-standard symbolic distance effect found earlier for cRT: 
Any inferential comparison involving an end-item can be solved either deductively by considering 
and coordinating the two antecedent premises, or non-deductively by recognising that item-A will 
always be larger of any comparison and item-E will always be smaller in any comparison.  
(e) End-Anchor Effects 
   B&T advocates generally maintain that the first and last items within the implied series act as 
end-anchors, with the series built up from these items (Breslow, 1981). Our finding that outer 
premises are responded to faster and more accurately than inner premises lends some support to 
                                                                                        Getting One Step Closer to Deduction 23
this assertion. Item-A is usually claimed to be the uniquely unmarked item in that it is never given 
the marked label in premise or inferential comparisons. However, in practice it is not 
unambiguously unique because each of items-B, -C and -D are also given the unmarked label in at 
least some of their comparisons (Goodwin & Johnson-Laird, 2005; Wright, 2001). The fact that 
all items except item-E are given the unmarked label in at least some comparisons, may be taken 
together with the typical assertion that the reasoner thinks primarily in terms of unmarked 
relations (this is why they are termed unmarked in the first place – Wynne, 1998). This leads to 
the posit that item-E is in some practical sense even more unique than item-A, because it is the 
only item never a candidate for a decision (i.e., the reasoner never has to indicate that it is larger 
of any comparison).  
   Figure 1 (Top) depicts response-accuracy on the three comparison-pairs involving the A end-
item versus those for the E end-item, but excluding the A?E pair which was common to both end-
items. It can be seen that for each pair of bars in the figure, the E comparison was indeed superior 
to the A comparison. This trend was assessed via a two-way ANOVA. The factors were end-
anchor (A v E) and comparison-pair. The main effect of end-anchor was statistically significant (F 
(1, 54) = 78.414, p < 0.005, Obs.Power = 1.000). The main effect of anchored-comparison-pair 
was also statistically significant (F (2,108) = 17.216, p < 0.005, Obs.Power = 1.000). Figure 1 
shows a tendency for the 0-step comparison-pair to have an advantage over the 1-step and 2-step 
pairs that involve item-E, but the reverse pattern regarding item-A. This was confirmed by a 
statistically significant two-way interaction (F (2, 108) = 5.742, p < 0.005, Obs.Power = 0.858). 
Insert Figure 1 about Here 
   The end-anchor effect for RT is also depicted in Figure 1. This effect was examined separately 
for nRT and cRT. Taking nRT first, Figure 1 (Middle) shows little overall difference between 
responses involving item-A and those involving item-E. There was, however, a difference 
according to comparison-pair, with the 1-step pair attracting the slowest RT. A two-way ANOVA 
analogous to that for response-accuracy showed no overall main effect of end-anchor (F (1, 54) < 
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1.000 N.S.). Although not in line with the B&T task, this finding mirror the profile found by 
Wright (2006b), on a B&T-variant intended to remove as many non-deductive routes to solution 
as possible. Our analysis revealed the difference between the pairs to be statistically significant (F 
(2, 108) = 13.261, p < 0.005, Obs.Power = 0.997). Figure 1 shows a tendency for item-A to have 
an nRT advantage for the close pairs, turning into an item-E advantage for the far pairs. This 
interaction was statistically significant (F (2, 108) = 3.425, p < 0.050, Obs.Power = 0.632). 
   For cRT, Figure 1 (Bottom) shows a larger overall difference between comparisons involving 
the A item and those involving the E item, with E tending to result in faster performance. A two-
way ANOVA showed that unlike for nRT, the main effect of end-anchor was statistically 
significant (F (1, 54) = 15.481, p < 0.005, Obs.Power = 0.972). The main effect of pair was also 
statistically significant (F (2, 108) = 17.220, p < 0.005, Obs.Power = 1.000), as was the two-way 
interaction (F (2, 108) = 3.449, p < 0.050, Obs.Power = 0.636).  
   Regarding RT, when we use the nRT format favoured by most B&T studies, we find no robust 
end-anchor effect. However, when we rely on cRT instead of nRT, we do find an end-anchor 
effect, but contrary both to earlier studies based on nRT only (e.g., Acuna et al., 2002) and also 
cRT studies (e.g., Holcomb et al., 1997), the cRT end-anchor advantage is for item-E (i.e., the 
marked end-anchor) rather than item-A (i.e., the unmarked end-anchor). Our cRT findings were 
closely matched by our findings for response-accuracy, with the marked end-anchor again having 
an advantage over the unmarked end-anchor (contrast Bouwmeester, 2007; Stromer et al., 1993; 
Trabasso, 1977). Our claim of an item-E advantage is actually implicitly supported by a number 
of existing B&T studies, even though the papers concerned rarely acknowledge and discuss this 
aspect of their data (e.g., see Russell et al., 1996). Wright (2006b) has reported that the tendency 
for item-E to be the pivot of the entire series is present even in studies based around fully 
randomised B&T tasks, if we measure performance early in training.  
   To focus briefly on end-anchor premise pairs, the B&T task predicts that the A:B premise would 
be responded to fastest and most accurately (Breslow, 1981; Trabasso, 1977). However, as can be 
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seen from Figure 1, the D:E premise actually holds an advantage over A:B both for response-
accuracy and cRT; although it is reversed for nRT. But this D:E advantage is denied in most 
theories of transitive reasoning and hence not model led in computer simulations (e.g., see De 
Lillo et al., 2001; Wu & Levy, 2001). Yet a D:E advantage can be readily observed in data 
summaries of many studies using the B&T task: It emerged in Moses et al. (2006) with young 
adults, in all three experiments of Siemann and Delius (1996) with adults, and all three tasks of 
Russell et al. (1996) with children. 
(f) The Serial Position Effect 
   According to the serial position effect, performance should get slower and less accurate as we 
move away from either end of the series toward the middle; and performance should favour 
comparisons involving the unmarked item-A over the marked item-E (Bryson & Leong, 2007). 
This effect was indexed by averaging all four premise/inferential pairs that involved item-A. The 
same was then done for the four pairs involving item-B, including pair B:A, and so on for items 
C, D and E. The response-accuracy profile across the five items is shown in Figure 2 (Top). This 
shows that item-A attracted lowest rather than highest accuracy, with B, C and D higher than A 
but similar to each other (although systematically decreasing), and item-E attracting the highest 
performance. The statistical significance of these differences was assessed using a one-way 
ANOVA, with five levels. This yielded a significant effect of item position (F (4, 216) = 66.879, p 
< 0.005, Obs.Power = 1.000). Contrast analyses indicated that item-C yielded significantly lower 
accuracy than B, with item-D lower than both (each p < 0.005). Less surprisingly given our earlier 
findings, item-A was lower than B, C and D; with item-E higher than them all (each p < 0.005). 
   The serial position effect for RT was calculated in the same way as response-accuracy. Figure 2 
(Bottom) summarises the nRT and cRT profile from item-A to item-E. For nRT, this shows 
slowing from item-A through to C, and then speeding up to item-E. Also, E was responded to 
faster than A overall. For cRT, the slowest performance was once again in the middle of the series 
but this time, item-D had a slightly slower cRT than C. As for nRT, the cRT for item-E was 
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fastest, but this time item-A was responded to more slowly than item-B as well. A two-way 
ANOVA showed that RT-Type was statistically significant (F (1, 54) = 19.247, p < 0.005, 
Obs.Power = 0.991). Item-position was also statistically significant (F (4, 216) = 6.854, p < 0.005, 
Obs.Power = 0.993). The difference between nRT and cRT did not seem to follow any simple 
pattern. This difference was largest for item-A and smallest for item-E but there was no obvious 
pattern for B, C and D. Nevertheless, this A versus E difference facilitated a statistically 
significant two-way interaction (F (4, 216) = 5.494, p < 0.005, Obs.Power = 0.975). 
   So, we did not find the U-shaped serial position effect B&T theorists predict for response-
accuracy. But the finding that item-A had a disadvantage rather than an advantage compared to 
item-E, with item-E superior to the middle three items, is in line with recent findings by Wright 
(2006b), although it contrasts with other previous findings (e.g., Hummel & Holyoak, 2001; 
Wynne, 1998). Hummel and Holyoak’s (2001) computational model of transitive reasoning does 
not explicitly cover this serial position effect. Yet, the method they employed for placing the 
premises within an integrated spatial array actually results in each item from each premise being 
given an absolute location; this reducing to the standard serial position effect. In partial 
agreement, we concede a “restricted serial position effect”, as long as we ignore the two end-
items. We found stronger evidence of the inverted-U-shaped serial position effect for nRT, with 
slowing from each end towards item-C. However, this effect was ambiguous because the fastest 
performance was not at item-A but rather at item-E. A similar profile was found for cRT, apart 
from slowest performance now being at item-D. In both cases, the RT effect was driven more by 
item-E than by item-A.  
 (g) The Critical B?D Inference and Other 1-Step Inferences 
   The final set of analyses concerned each of the 1-step inferences and its corresponding 
antecedents. These were for the critical B?D inference, A?C inference and C?E inference, 
respectively. Beginning with B?D, we see from Table 3 that for this inference, B?D accuracy was 
lower than the mean of B:C and C:D. A one-way ANOVA was conducted concerning B?D. This 
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had three levels, the first two of which corresponded to the two antecedents B:C and C:D, and the 
last corresponding to the B?D inference. This yielded a statistically significant main effect of 
comparison-pair (F (2, 108) = 9.448, p < 0.005, Obs.Power = 0.977). Difference-contrasts showed 
that B?D was significantly lower than its two antecedents combined (p < 0.005).  
   For RT, Table 3 shows that nRT for B?D was slower than the mean of its antecedents. A 
similar, if more marked, profile is shown for cRT. A two-way ANOVA tested the reliability of 
these trends. The first factor being RT-Type and the second factor being comparison-pair. The 
difference between nRT and cRT was statistically significant (F (1, 54) = 17.874, p < 0.005, 
Obs.Power = 0.986). The differences between the pairs was also statistically significant (F (2, 
108) = 13.562, p < 0.005, Obs.Power = 0.998). There was a statistically significant two-way 
interaction effect (F (2, 108) = 4.181, p < 0.050, Obs.Power = 0.725). Difference-contrasts for 
nRT indicated no statistically significant difference between B:C and C:D (p > 0.100) but a 
significant difference between the B?D inference and its antecedents combined (p < 0.010). 
Corresponding contrasts for cRT indicated that premise C:D had a longer cRT than B:C, and the 
B?D inference had a longer cRT than its antecedents, whether they were taken individually or 
averaged (each p < 0.050). 
   For the first of the non-critical 1-step inferences, Table 3 shows that the A?C inference was 
again less accurate than its antecedents. This was confirmed using a one-way ANOVA, by a 
statistically significant difference between the comparison-pairs (F (2, 108) = 40.043, p < 0.005, 
Obs.Power = 1.000). Difference contrasts then confirmed that A?C was less accurate than its two 
antecedents combined (p < 0.005). Table 2 also shows that A?C was slower than either of its 
antecedents, with premise A:B responded to much faster than B:C. This pattern held regardless of 
whether we relied on nRT or cRT, but as before, cRT resulted in longer times. A two-way 
ANOVA showed the main effect of RT-Type to be statistically significant (F (1, 54) = 19.759, p < 
0.005, Obs.Power = 0.992), as was the main effect of comparison-pair (F (2, 108) = 23.126, p < 
0.005, Obs.Power = 1.000). The two-way interaction was statistically significant (F (2, 108) = 
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8.314, p < 0.005, Obs.Power = 0.959). Difference-contrasts for nRT showed that A?C took 
significantly longer than its antecedents combined (p < 0.005). For cRT, the A?C inference was 
again longer than its antecedents combined (p < 0.005).  
   Considering response-accuracy for the C?E inference, Table 3 shows that, unlike the other two 
1-step cases, C?E fell between its two antecedents but was very much closer to D:E. The result 
was that for this comparison only, the inference was actually superior to the mean of its 
antecedents; which is in line with item-E being the pivot of the implied series plus items further 
apart being easier to discriminate between. A one-way ANOVA showed the overall difference 
between the comparison-pairs to be statistically significant (F (2, 108) = 64.597, p < 0.005, 
Obs.Power = 1.000). Difference contrasts showed that C?E was significantly higher than its mean 
antecedents (p < 0.005). This is in line with our conclusion above, that item-E is unique within the 
implied transitive series, and hence any comparison against this item can be correctly given 
without the need to coordinate the antecedents deductively (Wright, 2001). 
   Then, for RT, Table 3 fits the more usual pattern of the C?E inference being slower than its 
mean antecedents. However, from Table 2 we saw that the C:D premise was responded to with a 
similar cRT to the C?E inference itself. Furthermore, C:D was markedly slower than D:E. This 
profile is again in line with our claim that responses involving item-E do not require consideration 
of any interlinked information. A two-way ANOVA showed a statistically significant main effect 
of RT-Type (F (1, 54) = 6.221, p < 0.050, Obs.Power = 0.688) and of pair (F (2, 108) = 8.139, p < 
0.005, Obs.Power = 0.955). The two-way interaction approached but did not reach statistical 
significance (F (2, 108) = 2.791, p > 0.050, Obs.Power = 0.539). For nRT, difference-contrasts 
showed that the antecedents did not differ significantly from each other, and the slower C?E 
inference compared to the mean of its antecedents also was not statistically significant (each p > 
0.050). Things were slightly different for cRT. Now the difference contrast showed that the D:E 
antecedent was responded to significantly faster than C:D as well as faster than the C?E inference 
(p < 0.005); with this causing the C?E inference to be slower than the mean of its antecedents but 
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this difference only reaching marginal statistical significance (p = 0.060). 
   The findings for the three 1-step inferences versus their respective mean antecedents are quite 
clear. For the critical B?D case, the much lower response-accuracy and slower cRT for the 
inference compared to its antecedents, suggests that the critical B?D inference was being reached 
via deduction (Wright, 2006a, 2006b; Wright & Dowker, 2002). Quite surprisingly, despite the 
A?C inference being influenced by the end-anchor effect from item-A, the response-accuracy and 
cRT profiles were nevertheless similar to that for the critical B?D inference. Then for the C?E 
case, the greater uniqueness of the item-E end-anchor compared to the item-A end-anchor, led to 
the profile shown for A?C and B?D cases, holding for RT (particularly cRT) although it did not 
quite hold for response-accuracy. Thus, for A?C, deduction still played a part but this time 
alongside some non-deductive strategy, with the C?E case suggesting deduction may have played 
little part in the C?E inference. Because gauging the relative contributions of the deductive and 
non-deductive strategies is difficult for the A?C case and the C?E case, we would suggest that 
only the B?D inference is relied on as any basis for conclusions about whether a particular group 
possesses or does not possess a deductive competence for transitive inference.  
General Discussion 
   Before discussing the implications of our findings to our main goal, we consider the findings in 
relation to our three specific aims as we initially set out. First, this experiment avoided the need 
for the reasoner to learn and retain the premise information by removing the need for repeated 
training. However, removing these memory demands did not render our 5-term task easier than 
the B&T task. Rather, both our overall performance and the critical B?D inference were much 
closer to the 50% chance level than to the perfect performance one might expect of young adults 
(63.8% and 55.1%, respectively). So, when we ensure the design and procedures avoid as many 
short-cut cues to the transitive response as is feasible, and we also avoid a training regime likely 
to induce rather than assess transitive responses, even adults presumably near their peak in 
cognitive ability do not perform as well as B&T task studies report for 4 year-old children. One 
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implication is that, in contrast to the currently dominant view in transitive research (e.g., Bryant, 
1998; Halford & Andrews, 2004), transitive reasoning here which is likely to be deductive 
particularly for the critical comparisons, is not the primary mode of reasoning indexed using most 
previous B&T tasks (see Markovits & Dumas, 1992; Markovits et al., 1995; Wright, 2006a, b).  
   Second, to help review the many findings for response-accuracy, non-discriminative RT (nRT) 
and RT for correct responses only (cRT), we included three evaluative columns in Table 3 (one 
after each respective measure). The evaluative columns showed that very few B&T task response 
profiles typically taken as indicating logic, deduction or rationality, remained present on our non-
B&T task. Most profiles were either absent or completely reversed for response-accuracy and our 
two RT measures. Our present finding that only a minority of B&T phenomena appear when we 
use a task much more likely to encourage participants to rely on their deductive competencies, is 
further evidence that many of the usual B&T phenomena stem more from the procedures used in 
those tasks than from the deployment of deduction (Markovits et al., 1995; Wright & Dowker, 
2002).  
   Third, our findings indicate that nRT measures lead to different response profiles to those based 
on cRT; with cRT supporting more B&T profiles than nRT. This is a pertinent finding, especially 
given that most B&T studies have neglected to use the more valid cRT index of RT. Those B&T 
phenomena that are found both on the present task and on B&T tasks more generally, were 
without exception the ones for which the correct solution could easily be reached by considering 
only one of the two premises logically sufficient for that conclusion. In other words, they are the 
ones that could be solved via a less demanding and non-deductive strategy. We should therefore 
be cautious about using response profiles such as end-anchor effects and the standard symbolic 
distance effect as direct evidence that a deductive mode for transitive inference is being utilised 
(contrast Bryant, 1998; Halford & Andrews, 2004; McGonigle & Chalmers, 1992; Trabasso, 
1977; Wynne, 1998). 
   We now turn to our main goal of integrating B&T findings with the present findings. Transitive 
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research has been heavily influenced by the assumption that the only way to solve for inferential 
questions is to construct the entire linearly-interlinked series implied by the premises. This 
assumption is in the child and adult reasoning literature, in the animal literature and even in much 
of the computational literature (e.g., Acuna et al., 2002; De Lillo et al., 2001; Holcomb et al., 
1997; Hummel & Holyoak, 2001; Martin & Alsop, 2004; Siemann & Delius, 1998; Trabasso, 
1977). As an illustration, Schnall and Gattis (1998) conclude that effects such as the symbolic 
distance effect derive from the necessity of constructing some sort of mental array in long-term 
memory. Similarly, Halford and Andrews (2004) state “The process of constructing the ordered 
set representation is an important part of the reasoning process, because it is there that the 
transitivity principle has to be applied.” (Halford & Andrews, 2004, pp.126).  
   By “transitivity principle”, Halford and Andrews allude to the target deductive competence. 
Chapman (1999) concedes that the representation of the implied series in memory (Halford & 
Andrew’s “ordered set representation”) may indeed be important. However, Chapman argues that 
what is even more important are the cognitive mechanisms whose operations result in this mental 
representation in the first place. For example, it may well be that transitive responses are deduced 
via the reasoner constructing and reading off from mental models (Bara et al., 2001; Goodwin & 
Johnson-Laird, 2005; Hummel & Holyoak, 2001). However, what we really need to know is what 
knowledge, experience or ability leads the reasoner to choose to set up mental models in the first 
place? Also, what is the basis of the reasoner’s realisation that constructing and reading off from 
such models might solve transitive problems anyway? We would argue that it is these abilities 
that approximate to any deductive competence in adults. It is crucial to note that none of these 
abilities are to be gleaned from the mental representation of the entire transitive series itself. 
   The above point notwithstanding, in our task here, constructing the entire series was in any 
event never logically necessary. The generally-applicable strategy was constructing temporarily 
only that part of the implied series necessary to find the answer desired. But although this renders 
Halford and Andrew’s (2004) account unlikely to have been the route to solution for our task here 
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(Wright, 1998a), the account may yet hold for the B&T task. B&T tasks typically require all 10 
possible comparisons to be reported tens of times or even hundreds of times over; with training 
and test taking anything between around 30 minutes and over 12 months, depending on 
participant group (McGonigle & Chalmers, 1992; Russell et al., 1996; Wright, 2006b; Wynne, 
1998). In that case, it does make sense for reasoners to generate the entire implied series and give 
their answers by comparing the position of the items from the entire series. But then test 
performance would say very little about whether the reasoner used a deductive competence, 
because any deduction would have played its part at a point before testing began (Wright, 1998b, 
2006b).  
   As well as the test procedure, Wright (2001) argued that the method of training to ensure 
premise retention might induce reasoners to gradually build up the implied series. It was further 
argued that typical B&T phenomena, such as the symbolic distance effect, reflect the series that 
has been built up in memory, but are not relevant to the actual use of deduction. On this view, 
removing the need for training whilst also avoiding repeated questions about a given series, 
should lead to abolishment of such effects. But for symbolic distance, we abolished it for the usual 
but less valid B&T nRT measure, only to see it re-emerge for our more valid  cRT measure 
(although it was a non-standard effect that excluded the premise pairs). We might take this as 
evidence that, even when we avoid extensive premise training, the reasoner nevertheless 
constructs an integrated mental array and generates transitive inferences from this array, apart 
from the premises which can be reported perceptually. But in our task here, a symbolic distance 
effect could arise from a general solution strategy, rather than from mental representation of the 
entire implied series. Indeed, given that each of the many transitive questions we gave, was based 
on a different implied series, it is doubtful that reasoners here would have expended cognitive 
effort extracting the entire transitive series just to answer a single question. However, they could 
reduce overall load by identifying the end-anchors for each series. Then, if the end-anchor did not 
permit the inferential comparison to be made, the reasoner would go on to consider whether the 
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particular premise being focussed on was the one next to an end-anchor that had already been 
identified. A strategy such as this would lead to a profile resembling the symbolic distance effect. 
But it would exclude the premises because the solutions to these can be seen without considering 
any other item. This explanation readily accounts for why the 3-step comparisons were solved as 
readily as the directly perceivable relationships within the premise pairs: The reasoner started with 
a view of all the premises, which tended to permit the end-anchors to pop out before the focus was 
shifted to individual pairs. Further research is required to determine whether our symbolic 
distance effect (and other effects like inward-acquisition of premises) are due more to entire-series 
construction or more to the kind of strategy suggested here. For now it is sufficient to note that 
such effects should no longer be taken as unambiguous indicators of the deployment of deduction. 
Indeed, only the 1-step inferences are likely to involve deduction, with only one of these (here 
B?D) critical as an indicator. 
   Our above account can explain why the few B&T phenomena we found, were evident on our 
non-B&T task. We now consider why they might be far more evident on B&T tasks themselves. 
Wright (2001) argues that when extensive training is used, the premises are stored verbatim first, 
and then the entire series is gradually generalised associatively/passively (Brainerd & Kingma, 
1984). Conscious strategies are then used to report “gist” from the generalised series (Brainerd & 
Reyna, 1992). The point here is that, initially, the premise information is held separately from the 
generalisations stemming from that information, a posit for which there is some support both from 
human studies and comparative studies (Eichenbaum, 2001; Fernandez & Tendolkar, 2001: 
Reyna, 2004; Titone et al., 2004). The verbatim trace supports fast and accurate decisions about 
premises, and the generalisation trace is more durable and supports the standard symbolic distance 
effect (Brainerd & Reyna, 1992). This conceptualisation leaves room for the verbatim trace to be 
coordinated in a one-off manner in order to reach a given transitive solution deductively. In this 
event, it is reasonable to assume that, should this route be taken repeatedly, it becomes more and 
more economical to store the result, which would then enhance the seriative generalisation 
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process (Goodwin & Johnson-Laird, 2005; Reyna, 2004; Wright, 2001). Thus, again we reach the 
view that without careful theorising, it is problematic to assume that B&T tasks readily 
distinguish between deductive and non-deductive means of constructing the implied series.  
   Our findings and the above discussion clearly point to two general modes for reaching transitive 
solutions. One for situations likely to be one-off, and the other for situations likely to be repeated 
over and over again: Or one for new or novel situations and the other for heavily memorised 
information. Or even one for conscious/wilful inferences and the other for unconscious/automatic 
inferences (for similar conceptions see Bryson & Leong, 2007; Martin & Alsop, 2004; Schnall & 
Gattis, 1998; Reyna, 2004). We believe our present non-training single-response task calls for the 
reasoner to engage in deduction, although we concede that for comparisons involving an end-
item, a non-deductive strategy might actually take primacy over any deductive competence 
(Wright & Dowker, 2002). 
   With the B&T task, the method of ensuring premise retention and the procedure of asking for 
repeated answers from a single implied series, together tend both to induce the implied series 
AND to persuade reasoners to engage in a strategy of mentally scanning the internal 
representation of the series (Stromer et al., 1993). Siemann and Delius (1996) show that B&T 
tasks can indeed lead to passive generalisation of the transitive series. These researchers presented 
a transitive experiment as part of a computer game, and found that their most successful adult 
participants reached up to 100% accuracy without becoming conscious of the fact that the game 
had presented them with pair-wise alternatives constituting a 6-term transitive series. The 
summarised data in Titone et al.’s (2004) B&T task, indicate that their adult participants actually 
improved their performance from testing immediately following completion of training to a 
further test session with no intervening training. This implies that participants rehearsed and 
consolidated the series even when no further training was being given. The competence assessed 
by Siemann and Delius (1996) and Titone et al. (2004), then, is likely to be associative and 
memory-based. Whether or not one accepts this evaluation, we would argue that it is unsafe to 
                                                                                        Getting One Step Closer to Deduction 35
make statements about deduction from such studies; and yet in the B&T task, such designs appear 
to be the rule rather than the exception. 
   Our distinction here between associative and deductive routes to transitive responding is not just 
tied to transitive inference, but is also in line with a number of recent dual process theories of 
reasoning more generally (Evans, 2003; Ferreira et al., 2006; Kokis et al., 2002; Reyna, 2004). 
For instance, in Evans’ (2003) dual process theory, the distinction is between “System 2” which is 
sufficient for deductive inference-making, and “System 1” which is not sufficient for deductive 
inference-making but may still cause associative links permitting responding that sometimes 
resembles inferences. Evans (2003) summarises evidence that indicates system 2 (deductive) 
tends to lead to much slower decisions than system 1 (associative), and is more taxing on 
linguistic and working memory processes (see also De Neys & Glumicis, in press). In line with 
this assertion, the average nRT for the present task was some three times slower than found in the 
B&T variant used by Wright (2006b). 
   Like Evans’ (2003) dual process theory, Ferreira et al. argue that the associative mode is based 
on generalisations or heuristics, whereas the deductive mode is based on consciously-controlled or 
rule-based strategies. However, Kokis et al. (2002) and Ferreira et al. (2006) independently note 
that although dual process theories seem quite compelling, there is as yet fairly little empirical 
evidence in support of such theories. Our present findings would seem to add to the mounting 
support for dual process theories. Ferreira et al. (2006) also provide additional evidence by way of 
four experiments concerning inductive and probabilistic reasoning. They found that priming 
affected the associative mode but not the deductive mode; whereas secondary tasks, change of 
reasoning context, or giving unrelated training to induce formal reasoning, each affected the 
deductive mode but not the associative mode.  
   Ferreira et al. concluded that the two modes are not competitive, but rather they can be almost 
totally independent of each other. This contrasts with Evans (2003) who reviewed evidence 
pointing to an interaction between the associative and deductive modes, whereby the use of the 
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deductive mode acts to inhibit the utility of the associative mode. But our present results, taken in 
conjunction with those of Wright (2006b) permit one further postulated relationship. That is, it is 
possible that the associative and deductive modes derive largely from separate functional systems 
(Ferreira et al. ‘s independence); but also that these systems interact dynamically depending on 
the reasoning task (Evans’ suppression). For example, as argued earlier, repeated exposure to the 
same premises and test questions would lead both the associative and deductive modes to 
generalise the entire implied transitive series (i.e., support one another). Such a dynamic interplay 
may serve an adaptive advantage; permitting the more powerful deductive mode to take the lead 
in decision-making when the context permits (e.g., when there is more time or fewer exposures to 
premises). However, the deductive system will not be as beneficial when there are constraints on 
decision-making (e.g., when time is an issue or the transitive solution is sought simultaneously 
with another train of thought – see Ferreira et al., 2006). Here, we may give increasing primacy to 
the older associative system, which will tend to generate less demanding and much faster 
decisions but at the cost of accuracy or validity of transitive solutions. But lower accuracy or 
greater risk of biased conclusions may be an acceptable cost, and may even be beneficial if the 
situation would benefit more from an experience-based decision than a logic-based one. 
   Indeed, in one variant on the dual process theory (Reyna, 2004), it is argued that the more 
associative (gist-based) process often actually takes the lead in reasoning about risks, whether 
personal, medical or abstract. The argument is basically that rationality is not perfect deduction 
precisely because it involves these two processes both in parallel and in interaction (De Neys & 
Glumicic, in press). One implication is that in contrast with Evans’ (2003) dual process theory, 
Reyna’s (2004) theory holds that older more associative brain systems were not superseded by 
newer deductive ones, but the two work together to produce something that is more rational or 
adaptive than either on its own; sometimes driven more by one mode and sometimes more by the 
other (De Neys & Glumicic, in press; Kokis et al., 2002).  
   It is highly unfortunate that for over 3 decades now, the transitive research field has been 
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convinced that there is only one transitive mode. As argued by Wright (1998a), the insistence on 
the use of the B&T task has then led to the wrong (i.e., associative) mode to be taken as the only 
valid or useful (deductive) mode (Acuna et al., 2002; Breslow, 1981; Bryant, 1998; Bryant & 
Trabasso, 1971; Hummel & Holyoak, 2001; Siemann & Delius, 1998; Trabasso, 1977). Indeed, 
some are so committed to these views that they advocate manipulation of number of premises, 
amount of training, the form of feedback, or even the specific questions asked about comparison-
pairs; all in order to guarantee the entire transitive series is represented in long-term memory 
before testing for transitivity (e.g., De Lillo et al., 2001; Holcomb et al., 1997; Russell et al., 1996; 
Stromer et al., 1993; Titone et al., 2004). For instance, Russell et al., trained 6 year-olds to 100% 
and then waited 12 minutes before testing, to ensure the entire series was in long-term memory. 
This is at odds with the dual process assertion about general reasoning, that the memory loads for 
deduction tend to be on working memory rather than on long-term memory, and on explicit 
representation rather than on implicit representation (Evans, 2003; Kokis et al., 2002). Indeed, 
data from Titone et al. (2004) intimate that procedures such as used by Russell et al. (1996) may 
invalidate the task regarding deduction-based transitive inference. As an alternative to Russell et 
al.’s approach, Acuna et al. (2002) increased the items in the series from 5 to 11 and gave 
additional training, and then requested answers only about distance from one end-anchor, to 
ensure a symbolic distance effect. We have already seen that this is unlikely to call for deduction, 
either for B&T tasks or our own task here. 
   But this does not mean that the associative mode has little use today. Allen (2006) points out 
that, particularly for non-humans, great importance may be attached to being able to place oneself 
along a transitive continuum such as the social rank of maybe 80 potential competitors. However, 
the importance of this kind of preoccupation is far lower for humans than for non-humans (Archie 
et al., 2006; De Lillo et al., 2001; Hummel & Holyoak, 2001; Siemann & Delius, 1998). For 
humans, concrete situations calling for a deductive transitive competence will more often involve 
fewer than five entities and will not include opportunities for a large number of repeated 
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exposures to premise information. Indeed, such situations will tend to centre around education, 
work and social problem solving; each of which is highly relevant to humans and largely 
irrelevant to non-humans (Allen, 2006; Goel et al., 2004; Markovits & Dumas, 1999; Russell et 
al., 1996). 
   Chapman (1999) argues that the target deductive mechanism in question must to some extent be 
founded in linguistic competencies (see also, Evans, 2003; Hummel & Holyoak, 2001; Sternberg, 
1980; Reyna, 2004; Wright, 1998b), although Wright (2001) and Stromer et al. (1993) 
independently note that there is no current evidence that we need to impute a linguistic basis over 
and above a merely symbolic basis. Wright (2001) goes further, arguing that actually it may be the 
symbolic competence that underlies language acquisition in humans and also the transitive 
competencies of some, but almost certainly not all, non-human species (McGonigle & Chalmers, 
1992).  
   To sum, we have presented theorising and findings that show that the generic B&T task is likely 
to have missed its target deductive transitive phenomenon, but this does not mean that it is 
irrelevant to improving our understanding of transitive inference. Also, transitive research still has 
plenty to offer current theories of wider reasoning. The challenge now is to modify a well 
specified model that already accommodates transitive reasoning (e.g., Bara et al., 2001; De Lillo 
et al., 2001; Halford & Andrews, 2004; Hummel & Holyoak, 2001; Wu & Levy, 2001) so that it 
now captures both the deductive and associative mechanisms for transitive inference. But there is 
so much more to be gained from better understanding transitive inference than that: The original 
task was intended to be discriminative, telling apart individuals/groups highly competent in 
making deductive transitive inferences from those lower in this competence (Piaget, 1970; 
Markovits et al., 1995). Whilst the B&T task generally shows itself to give positive results but is 
poor at distinguishing between groups, our alternative non-training single-response task offers to 
do both. Thus, it can contribute to issues such as which brain areas or functional neural systems 
play a primary role in deductive versus associative transitive inference, whether consciousness is 
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essential for deductive transitive inference, whether both forms of transitive inference are equally 
strongly related to language, whether the memory-independence effect applies to the deductive 
mode as well as associative mode, and which species are developing a deductive mode of 
transitive inference (Bara et al., 2001; Brainerd & Reyna, 1992; Goel et al., 2004; Martin & 
Alsop, 2004; Moses et al., 2006; Wright, 2001; Yamazaki, 2004). Of course it will definitively 
settle the original debate on the age children really become competent in deductive transitive 
inference (Holcomb et al., 1997; Wright, 2006a). But more applied-cognition questions can also 
now be tackled such as whether deduction is really diminished in schizophrenia, whether 
disabilities such as blindness have knock-on effects on deductive versus non-deductive transitive 
inference, whether spatial navigation is supported more by deductive or associative transitive 
inference, whether the deductive mode of transitive inference alters in old age, and whether 
associative training can improve deductive competencies in reasoners with learning difficulties 
(Ittyerah & Samarapungavan, 1989; Maydak et al., 1995; Stromer et al., 1993; Schnall & Gattis, 
1998; Titone et al., 2004; Viskontas et al., 2005). 
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Table 1:   Summary of Correct Responses 
 Comparison-Pairs Overall 
0-Step A:B 49.091 
(4.677) 
B:C 64.848 
(2.395) 
C:D 58.636 
(2.475) 
D:E 87.424 
(1.512) 
65.000 
(2.036) 
1-Step  A?C 37.576  
(3.624) 
B?D 55.152 
(2.157) 
C?E 82.273 
(1.935) 
58.333 
(1.645) 
2-Step   A?D 38.182  
(3.781) 
D?E 84.545 
(2.210) 
61.364 
(1.649) 
3-Step    A?E 79.848  
(1.856) 
79.849 
(1.856) 
Overall    63.758 
(1.524) 
 
 
Note, Numbers in parentheses are Standard Errors  
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Table 2:   Summary for the Two Response-Time Measures 
 
 
 
Comparison Pairs nRT 
 
Overall 
 
0-Step 
 
A:B 2502 (88) 
 
B:C 2871 (119) C:D 2843 (90) D:E 2700 (113) 
 
2729 (89) 
 
1-Step 
 
 
 
A?C 2942 (112) B?D 3131 (137) C?E 2965 (148) 
 
3013 (117) 
 
2-Step 
 
 
 
 A?D 2837 (125) B?E 2715 (104) 
 
2776 (105) 
  
3-Step 
 
 
 
  A?E 2737 (116) 
 
2737 (116) 
 
Overall 
 
 
 
  2825 (95) 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison Pairs cRT 
 
 
 
0-Step 
 
A:B 2784 (111) 
 
B:C 2922 (123) C:D 3142 (3142) D:E 2714 (111) 
 
2891 (104) 
 
1-Step 
 
 
 
A?C 3573 (166) B?D 3606 (177) C?E 3131 (170) 
 
3437 (156) 
 
2-Step 
 
 
 
 A?D 3388 (169) B?E 3001 (167) 
 
3195 (153) 
 
3-Step 
 
 
 
  A?E 2969 (142) 
 
2969 (142) 
 
Overall 
 
 
 
  3123 (119) 
 
 
Note, Numbers in parentheses are Standard Errors 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                        Getting One Step Closer to Deduction 48
Table: 3: Summary and Evaluation Regarding B&T Phenomena 
 Response-
Accuracy 
Fits 
B&T
nRT Fits 
B&T
cRT Fits 
B&T 
Lexical Marking: 
Unmarked Premises 
56.97 (3.226) NO 2687 (98) NO 2853 (106) NO 
Marked Premises 73.03 (1.540)  2771 (91)  2928 (111)  
Inward-Acquisition: 
Outer Premises 
68.258 (2.782) YES 2601(94) YES 2749 (100) YES 
Inner Premises 61.742 (2.628)  2857 (94)  3032 (115)  
1-Step: A?C Inference 37.576 (3.624) NO 2942 (112) NO 3573 (166) NO 
A?C Mean Antecedents 56.969 (3.536)  2687 (103)  2853 (117)  
1-Step: *B?D Inference 55.152 (2.157) NO 3131 (137)  NO 3606 (177)  NO 
B?D Mean Antecedents 61.742 (2.435)  2857 (104)  3032 (125)  
1-Step: C?E Inference 82.273 (1.935) YES 2965 (148) NO 3130 (170) NO 
C?E Mean Antecedents 73.03 (1.994)  2772 (101)  2928 (119)  
Serial Position NOT A OR E NO NOT A OR E NO NOT A OR E NO 
End-Anchor REVERSED NO ABOLISHED NO REVERSED NO 
Symbolic Distance NON 
STANDARD 
NO ABOLISHED NO NON 
STANDARD 
NO 
Overall Series LOW NO SLOW NO SLOWER NO 
Note, Numbers in parentheses are Standard Errors 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1 Top – Response-accuracy for the end-item effects. The E end-anchor was consistently 
superior to the A end-anchor. Middle – For nRT the difference between end-anchors favoured 
item-A for 0-step pairs but favoured item-E for 2-step pairs. Bottom – For cRT, pairs involving 
item-E were consistently responded to faster than those involving item-A.  
Figure 2 Top – Response-accuracy by serial position. Item-A did not fit the serial position effect, 
and nor did the gradation from item-B to item-D. Bottom - For non-discriminative-RT (nRT), 
performance slowed from the end towards the centre; but item-E was faster than item-A. For 
correct-only-RT (cRT), there was no systematic pattern of serial position. 
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Figure 1  
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Figure 2 
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